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THE 2001 CAPE TOWN CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT
AND AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT PROTOCOL:
INTERNATIONALISING ASSET-BASED FINANCING
PRINCIPLES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
AIRCRAFT AND ENGINES
LORNE S. CLARK*
O N NOVEMBER 16, 2001, delegations from 68 States and 14
international organizations,' meeting in diplomatic confer-
ence in Cape Town, South Africa, adopted the Cape Town Con-
vention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment2 and
the Aircraft Equipment Protocol 3 thereto.4 This event was par-
ticularly noteworthy for a number of reasons: it was the first ma-
jor diplomatic conference ever held in South Africa's "mother
city" and the first time that Cape Town has given its name to an
international treaty; it broke new ground in enshrining asset-
based financing principles in a multilateral treaty applicable to
aircraft and engines; it demonstrated unprecedented coopera-
tion between the International Institute for the Unification of
* Mr. Clark is Senior International Adviser to the UK aviation law firm
Beaumont and Son, former Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate
Secretary of IATA and Head of the IATA Delegation to the Cape Town
Diplomatic Conference, and former Ambassador of Canada to several countries.
I Diplomatic Conference to Adopt a Mobile Equipment Convention and an Aircraft Pro-
tocol, Cape Town, South Africa, 29 October - 16 November 2001, at http://www.
unidroit.org/english/intemationalinterests/conference2001/main.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2004).
2 Opened for signature, Nov. 16, 2001, available at http://www.unidroit.org/eng
lish/conventions/c-main.htm [hereinafter Convention].
3 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment,
opened for signature Nov. 16, 2001, available at http://www.unidroit.org/ [hereinaf-
ter Protocol].
4 The "categories of mobile equipment" covered by the Convention are: "(a)
airframes, aircraft engines and helicopters; (b) railway rolling stock; and (c)
space assets." Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 3. In the Aircraft Protocol
"Aircraft objects" are defined as "airframes, aircraft engines and helicopters."
Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, para. 2(c).
4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [69
Private Law (Unidroit) 5 and the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO), the two organizations under whose aegis the
Diplomatic Conference was convened; it represented the culmi-
nation of almost unprecedented public-private sector coopera-
tion among governments, international organizations and the
aviation industry, including aerospace manufacturers, aircraft
and engine leasing companies, banks and other lending institu-
tions engaged in financing aircraft and engine acquisition; and
it laid the groundwork for the negotiation and adoption of at
least two further Protocols to the Cape Town Convention: one
on Railway Rolling Stock' and one on Space Assets.7
The Cape Town Conference was the successful result of more
than thirteen years of work: within Unidroit from 1988 to 1997,
and from 1997 to 2001 in several forums; in particular the Avia-
tion Working Group (AWG),8 the International Air Transport
Association (IATA)9 and ICAO, as well as in Unidroit. At the
end of the period 1988 to 1997, Unidroit found itself in a verita-
ble cul-de-sac as its diligent efforts to produce new treaty law
governing security interests in cross border transactions con-
cerning high-value mobile assets were largely frustrated by the
virtual impossibility of devising a single regime applicable to
property as diverse as aircraft and engines, railway rolling stock,
space property, offshore oil rigs and certain types of ships.
5 Unidroit, based in Rome, has 59 Member States. Unidroit - International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law: Presentation, at http://www.unidroit.org/eng
lish/presentation/main.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
6 The rail protocol is being coordinated by Unidroit with the close coopera-
tion of OTIF, the 41 Member State (mainly European) Intergovernmental Or-
ganization for International Carriage by Rail, with Headquarters in Berne. See
Development of Work Within UNIDROIT on International Interests in Mobile Equipment,
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/internationalinterests/history.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2004).
7 The space property protocol is being developed by Unidroit with the close
cooperation of the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-
COPUOS). Id.
8 The AWG is a not-for-profit trade association representing aerospace manu-
facturers, air transport leasing companies, and major financial institutions sup-
porting the aviation industry. It is co-chaired by Airbus and Boeing, and its
members include Bombardier, Boullioun Aviation, Citibank, debis Airfinance,
DVB Bank, EMBRAER, GE Capital Aviation, GE, Indosuez Air Finance, ILFC, JP
Morgan, KfW, Morgan Stanley, Rolls-Royce, Singapore Aircraft Leasing,
SNECMA and UTC- Pratt & Whitney. See AWG Structure and Membership, at http://
www.awg.aero/publiccontent/organisation.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
9 LATA's 270 member airlines carry over 95% of scheduled international traf-
fic. See IATA - About Us, at http://www.iata.org/about/index (last visited Jan. 26,
2004).
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In late 1996, The Boeing Company contacted IATA to seek
assistance in "breaking the logjam" in Unidroit with a specific
request that IATA propose a means of moving forward with re-
spect to aircraft equipment only. In early 1997, at a meeting
convened by the AWG in Paris and chaired by Boeing, the au-
thor-then General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of
IATA-recommended what came to be known as the "Conven-
tion plus Protocols" approach. This involved de-linking the vari-
ous properties, elaborating a shorter, more general "umbrella"
Convention and negotiating separately and securing the adop-
tion of a series of property-specific protocols to the Convention.
This proposal was immediately accepted and endorsed by
Boeing and the other members of the AWG and was formally
put to Unidroit, which after due consideration, enthusiastically
embraced the new concept. While Unidroit focused on the
"umbrella" Convention during the next two years, an Aircraft
Protocol Group (APG) was established at the invitation of the
President of Unidroit, with participation by IATA and the AWG.
ICAO was also invited to join. Jeffrey Wool,1" the AWG Secre-
tary, chaired the Group. Although ICAO had rejected overtures
from Unidroit in the early 1990s to become involved in the high
value mobile assets treaty development exercise (on the grounds
that that this would not be an "air law" treaty), the new invita-
tion regarding the proposed Aircraft Equipment Protocol was of
interest to ICAO and it became an active member of the APG
and contributed significantly to the development of the Aircraft
Protocol instrument.
Despite Unidroit's interest in proceeding with the elaboration
of Protocols on Railway Rolling Stock and Space Assets, it
quickly became common ground among all stakeholders that
the first Protocol, to be adopted at the same time as the Conven-
tion, would be an Aircraft Equipment Protocol. Thus, from
1997 to 2000, while Unidroit continued its efforts on the devel-
opment of the "umbrella" Convention, the elaboration of the
Aircraft Equipment Protocol was largely the result of intense
work on the part of the AWG and IATA, with significant input
from ICAO and overall coordination and oversight by Unidroit,
10 Mr. Wool, a partner at the law firm of Perkins Coie in Washington, D.C., is
an eminent aviation lawyer who contributed significantly to the Cape Town in-
struments process. He was an expert consultant to Unidroit in the field of avia-
tion finance and is currently AWG Group Secretary and General Counsel.
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so as to ensure full compatibility between the two evolving treaty
instruments.
Even after the IATA-proposed multi-protocol approach was
approved by Unidroit and accepted by the ICAO in 1997, and
despite heroic efforts by IATA and the AWG to move the project
forward more rapidly thereafter, the negotiating process leading
to Cape Town was at times frustratingly slow and pedantic. Nev-
ertheless, all of the stakeholders remained committed to the
elaboration of new international commercial law based on tried
and proven financial rules to reduce the cost of, and make more
available, cross border aircraft and engine acquisition. Also, un-
usual in the ICAO context, where treaty drafting is generally
within the purview of Ministries of Transport or Civil Aviation
and Foreign Ministries, the Mobile Equipment Convention at-
tracted the interest of and input from a much wider national
governmental spectrum, among which were Ministries ofJustice,
Ministries of Finance, Ministries of Economic Development and
Planning, and Ministries of International Trade.
The Cape Town Convention regime breaks new ground in
several respects, including the provisions in regard to its entry
into force and the legal relationship between the "umbrella"
Convention and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol and provisions
respecting the international registration of aircraft engines in
their own right as high value "mobile equipment." Thus, Article
49 of the Convention, 1 innovative among international legal in-
struments, intentionally delays entry into force of the Conven-
tion, even though it may have the requisite number of
ratifications, acceptances, approvals, or accessions (i.e., three),
until at least one Protocol is brought into force. The Aircraft
Protocol requires eight ratifications, acceptances, approvals, or
accessions to come into force.1 2
Furthermore, the Convention specifically provides for the Air-
craft Equipment Protocol and subsequent Protocols to override
and supersede the terms of the Convention itself.13 As can be
imagined, these rather novel features were the subject of
I Article 49 provides: "This Convention enters into force, but only as regards a
category of objects to which a Protocol applies: (a) as from the time of entry into
force of that Protocol; (b) subject to the terms of that Protocol; and (c) as be-
tween States parties to this Convention and that Protocol." Convention, supra
note 2, art. 49, para. 1.
12 Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXVIII, para. 1.
13 "The Convention shall apply in relation to aircraft objects as provided 6y the
terms of this Protocol" Id. art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added).
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lengthy and vigorous debate during the negotiating process.
The more traditionalist international lawyers, especially aviation
lawyers, argued against such innovation. On the other hand,
more pragmatic, asset-financing and commercial lawyers con-
tended that effective international regimes for the respective
properties required that the individual Protocols be paramount,
and that the Convention should make this crystal clear so as to
avoid any misapprehension and misinterpretation in the future.
While it is in fact normal practice for one or more subsequent
international legal instruments to amend an earlier treaty,14 it is
admittedly unusual to state categorically that a Protocol negoti-
ated and adopted at the same time as the Convention to which it
is directly and legally linked must prevail as between the two.
The core reason for this innovation goes back to the decision to
terminate the Unidroit effort to draft a single, all-encompassing
treaty applicable to aircraft equipment, railway rolling stock,
space assets, offshore oilrigs, and certain types of ships, in favor
of an "umbrella" Convention and diverse property-specific Pro-
tocols. With the abandonment of the "one size fits all" ap-
proach, it became necessary to ensure that the rules governing
specific property, such as aircraft and engines, prevailed over
any provisions set out in the generally applicable Convention.
In addition, it was considered imperative that the Convention
not be permitted to come into force in relation to a particular
type of property unless and until a property-specific Protocol
also came into force. This would assist and promote predictabil-
ity and transparency, two necessary attributes of the new asset-
based financing regime.
It is also worth noting that the Convention has specific provi-
sions dealing with "Relationship with other Conventions" and
which specifically state that the Cape Town instrument "shall
prevail over the 2001 UN Convention on the Assignment of Re-
ceivables in International Trade . . .as it relates to the assign-
ment of receivables which are associated rights related to
international interests in aircraft objects, railway rolling stock
and space assets. ' 15 Such prevalence, of course, will apply only
14 An excellent example is the Warsaw Convention air transport liability sys-
tem, where the 1929 Warsaw Convention has been amended by several subse-
quent instruments, including the 1972 Hague Protocol and the 1975 Montreal
Protocols.
15 Convention, supra note 2, art. 45; see also id. art. 46 (providing that the Proto-
col "may determine the relationship between this Convention and the (1988)
Unidroit Convention on International Financial Leasing.").
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as between parties to both Conventions. In turn, the Protocol
also has three articles dealing with its "Relationship with Other
Conventions" addressing: the 1948 Convention on the Interna-
tional Recognition of Rights in Aircraft; the 1933 Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Precaution-
ary Attachment of Aircraft; and the 1988 Unidroit Convention
on International Financial Leasing.16
With respect to aircraft equipment, the Cape Town regime is
designed to provide for the creation, enforcement, registration
and priority of security interests held by chargees, conditional
sellers, and lessors of aircraft and engines on a first-to-file basis,
and to establish a new International Registry to record such in-
terests. While complex due to the fact that the subject matter is
complicated and admittedly rather esoteric, the treaty system is
nevertheless user-friendly in that it gives Contracting States
broad latitude in deciding which particular international legal
obligations they wish to be bound by in addition to mandatory
provisions. This is accomplished through a system of "declara-
tions," which are known as the "opt in" or "opt out" provisions.
It is thus highly respectful of state sovereignty, of differing politi-
cal, economic, and social environments, differing speeds of eco-
nomic development, and national requirements as perceived by
governments, and it permits and facilitates changes in position
in accordance with changing circumstances and needs.
The "opt in" declarations are binding commitments by States
in relation to particular Convention/Protocol regime provisions
that would otherwise not be applicable to that State. 17 The "opt
out" declarations allow States to exclude applicability of certain
treaty provisions to them.1 8 In addition, there are mandatory
declarations relating to Regional Economic Integration Organi-
zations (such as the European Union), requiring specification
of matters within the competence of the Organization, as op-
posed to its Member States,' 9 and relating to whether remedies
16 Protocol, supra note 3, arts. XXIII-XV.
17 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 39 (regarding non-consensual rights and
interests having priority without registration); art. 40 (regarding registrable non-
consensual rights or interests); art. 60 (regarding application of Convention pri-
ority rules to pre-existing rights or interests).
18 See id. art. 54, para. 1 (relating to the power to lease a charged object located
in the declaring State's territory); id. art. 54, para. 2 (relating to extra-judicial
remedies); id. art. 55 (relating to interim relief); id. art. 50, para. 1 (relating to
application of Convention to international transactions).
19 Id. art. 48, para. 2.
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may be exercised only with leave of the relevant court. 2' The
Cape Town regime exhibits flexibility and openness to change,
in that, other than with respect to declarations made under Arti-
cle 60, concerning the application of Convention priority rules
to pre-existing rights or interests, a Contracting State may mod-
ify or replace any declaration at any time.21
The newly established International Registry, not to be con-
fused with Chicago Convention-type national aircraft regis-
tries,22 is a 24-hour a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, first-to-
file electronic registry established to implement the Convention
regime. In particular, it deals with registration of (a) interna-
tional interests, prospective international interests, and registra-
ble non-consensual rights and interests; (b) assignments and
prospective assignments; (c) acquisitions of international inter-
ests by legal or contractual subrogations under applicable law;
(d) notices of national interests; and (e) subordinations of inter-
ests referred to in (a) to (d) above. 23 For the purposes of this
provision (and certain other provisions) of the Convention, the
term "registration" includes "an amendment, extension or dis-
charge of a registration. '24
The International Registry was the subject of particularly de-
tailed and lengthy negotiation, with respect to both its nature
and responsibilities as well as its accountability and oversight.
The airlines, supported by the manufacturer, leasing company,
and financial institution members of the AWG, were concerned
that the registry structure be simple, efficient, and inexpensive,
to operate so as to ensure that only reasonable charges would be
imposed for recording transactions. ICAO, at least until the lat-
ter stages of the negotiating process, evidenced great interest in
being designated as the Registrar and developing this role into a
possible revenue-generating function for the Organization. In
Cape Town, it was finally agreed that the International Registry
would be a not-for-profit operation, though the fee structure
would provide for recovery of initial set-up costs over time, and
20 Id. art. 54, para. 2.
21 Id. arts. 57-58.
22 Nevertheless, Article XIX of the Protocol permits the designation by a Con-
tracting State of a national Chicago Convention-type registry as the "entry point
or entry points through which there shall or may be transmitted to the Interna-
tional Registry information required for registration .... Protocol, supra note 3,
art. XIX, para. 1.
23 Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, para. 1.
24 Id. art. 16, para. 3.
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the Registrar would be an individual rather than an interna-
tional organization or constituent part thereof.
25
Under the Convention/Protocol regime for aircraft and en-
gines, a "Supervisory Authority" for intergovernmental oversight
and regulation of the Registry is established 26 and Resolution
No. 2 of the Diplomatic Conference invites ICAO to fulfill this
function and to establish a Commission of Experts to assist the
Authority upon entry into force of the Cape Town treaty instru-
ments. 27 However, as part of the checks and balances instituted
by the Protocol, and to avoid centralizing too much control in
ICAO, 20 specifically designated States, selected to ensure ap-
propriate geographic representation and including those that
played a major part in the treaty-negotiating process, are em-
powered as a Preparatory Commission to act "with full author-
ity" as the Provisional Supervisory Authority for the
establishment of the Registry "under the guidance and supervi-
sion of ICAO. 28
As recognized high-value mobile equipment, aircraft engines
are to be registrable in the new International Registry in their
own right, in the same manner as airframes or helicopters.
Under Article XIV of the Protocol, specifically overriding what
would otherwise be applicable national law, neither an engine's
installation nor removal from an aircraft will affect the owner-
ship or other interest in the engine. 29 Thus, as pointed out in
the Official Commentary,30 "[s] o, if, for example, an aircraft en-
25 Protocol, supra note 3, art. XX, para. 3.
26 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, para. 1; Protocol, supra note 3, art.
XVII.
27 Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference to Adopt a Mobile Equipment Convention and
an Aircraft Protocol, Res. 2 (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.unidroit.org/english/in
ternationalinterests/conference2001/finalact.pdf [hereinafter Final Act].
28 The "for involvement in" States are "Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China,
Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Se-
negal, Singapore, Switzerland, South Africa, Tonga, United Arab Emirates and
the United States." Id.
29 Protocol, supra note 3, art. 14, para. 3.
30 The Official Commentary was approved for distribution by the ICAO and
Unidroit Secretariats by Resolution No. 5 of the Diplomatic Conference; the Offi-
cial Commentary is in five parts: (1) brief history of the Convention; (2) an Over-
view of the Convention; (3) an Overview of the Protocol; (4) article by article
analysis of the Convention; and (5) article by article analysis of the Protocol. See
Final Act, supra note 27, Res. 5. Roy GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
VENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND THE PROTOCOL
THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT (International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law 2002). Copies of the Official Commentary can
be ordered at www.unidroit.org/english/publications/goode/order.pdf.
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gine is leased by its owner to an airline and installed on its air-
craft, ownership of the engine does not pass to the airline but
remains with the lessor. ' 31 In this case, the International Regis-
try adopts the principle of title tracking rather than title
transfer.
The Diplomatic-Conference-approved Official Commentary
was prepared in order to assist governments in understanding
and appreciating the Convention/Protocol. It was written by
the Chairman of the Conference Drafting Committee, Professor
Sir Roy Goode. In addition the AWG prepared a highly useful
"Matrix of declarations permitted under the Convention and
Protocol. '3' Furthermore, partly in a bow towards the many gov-
ernment representatives who were insisting on a "single aircraft
equipment treaty," as opposed to the Convention/Protocol ap-
proach, 4 and partly for ease of convenience, interpretation, and
to facilitate application and implementation of the treaty re-
gime, a "Consolidated Text of the Convention and Aircraft
Equipment Protocol '3 5 was prepared jointly by Unidroit and the
ICAO Secretariats. 6 This Consolidated Text reproduces with
regard to "aircraft objects," i.e., airframes, aircraft engines, and
helicopters, the combined effect of the Convention and Aircraft
Equipment Protocol. As the Official Commentary indicates, the
Text is "designed as a useful working tool for those involved in
aviation finance and it [was] prepared with great care to ensure
conformity with the Convention and the Aircraft Equipment
Protocol." 7
While technically it has no legal status, though it was in fact
formally "noted" by the Diplomatic Conference, it is widely be-
lieved that this extremely helpful document will quickly become
the "text of choice" for everyday use. The Official Commentary,
the Matrix, and the Consolidated Text are currently under care-
31 GOODE, supra note 30 at 207.
32 Head of the United Kingdom Delegation and Emeritus Professor of Law,
University of Oxford.
33 GOODE, supra note 30, annex X.
34 These supporters believed that a single treaty would seriously disadvantage
and likely delay future international legal instruments in respect of railway rolling
stock, space assets and, possibly, other mobile equipment.
35 This was the subject of Resolution 1 of the Diplomatic Conference. See
GOODE, supra note 30 at annex IV.
36 Consolidated Text, available for purchase from Unidroit. For information
contact unidroit.rome@unidroit.org.
37 rd. at 2.
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ful scrutiny by governments in many parts of the world as they
actively consider ratification of the Cape Town instruments.
The Convention and Protocol were signed by 20 States at the
conclusion of the Cape Town Diplomatic Conference on No-
vember 16, 2001, and since then by six additional States, includ-
ing the United States, on May 9, 2003, and have thus far been
ratified by only one State, Panama, on July 28, 2003. The list is
set out below.
TABLE 1
SIGNATORIES OF THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION
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CONTRACTING STATE TO THE CAPE TOWN
CONVENTION AND AIRCRAFT PROTOCOL
Panama (with declarations) 28.VII.2003
Ethiopia (with declarations under Articles
39(1) (a), 40 and 54(2)) 21.XI.2003
Nigeria (with a declaration under Article 54(2)) 16.XII.2003
The treaty instruments require eight ratifications in order to
come into force.3 ' Despite ICAO's initial insistence on 30 ratifi-
cations, this relatively low number 9 was agreed to after many
months of spirited lobbying by IATA and the AWG and rather
heated debate in Cape Town. At its 57th Annual General Meet-
ing in Madrid in June 2001, the Members of IATA had unani-
mously adopted a Resolution stating that IATA: "strongly
reccomends that the treaties' rapid entry into force be facili-
tated by requiring a minimum number of ratifications for this
purpose."4 ° IATA and the AWG forcefully argued that, since the
treaties are private international commercially-oriented instru-
ments, quasi-universality or even widespread acceptance is not
needed to launch the new regime. This is especially so given
that less than 30 States account for over eighty percent of all
aircraft and engine transactions41 in today's world. The 30
States are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
the Netherlands, the three Scandinavian countries,4 2 Poland,
Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
38 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 49 (providing that only three ratifications
are required for its entry into force, but providing that it will come into force with
respect to aircraft and engines only when the Aircraft Equipment Protocol comes
into force after eight ratifications).
39 Unidroit's "normal" number of ratifications is only three, and thus, the Con-
vention requires only three; however, as noted, it cannot come into force in re-
spect of particular equipment without a relevant Protocol entering into force. See
id.
40 57th IATA Annual General Meeting Resolution IV; see also Flug Revue On-
line, Update (June 3, 2001), available at http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FR
Newsl/FRNewsOI/FR010603.htm ("[g]overnments were urged to support the
adoption of a proposed Convention and Protocol on advanced asset - based fi-
nancing and leasing, which would reduce the cost of credit by substantial sums.
Such adoption would take place at the Diplomatic Conference in Capetown, Oc-
tober 2001").
41 IATA, Presentation to the AWG Annual General Meeting (Oct. 20, 1999).
42 Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
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Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United King-
dom, and the United States.
Indeed, it was the strongly held common view of IATA, the
AWG and Unidroit, that any requirement for more than a sin-
gle-digit number of ratifications would create a risk that the
treaty instruments might never come into force, as has been the
case with a number of ICAO treaties.43 After intensive corridor
discussions and consultations among key government delega-
tions, ICAO, Unidroit, the AWG, and IATA, the diplomatic con-
ference endorsed this position.
As noted above, as a member of the Aircraft Protocol Group
ICAO had significant input into the Aircraft Protocol (and some
modest involvement in the elaboration of the "umbrella" Con-
vention), and the draft instruments were duly processed
through the Legal Committee and the Council of ICAO. Fur-
thermore, ICAO agreed to be a co-sponsor with Unidroit of the
Cape Town Diplomatic Conference. However Unidroit, the
AWG, and IATA were the continuing engines of progress, in par-
ticular, throughout the last three years of the negotiations. In
particular, the AWG and IATA were constantly pressing for time-
lines, and it was they who sought out, visited and secured a com-
mitment by South Africa to host the Diplomatic Conference.
The AWG and IATA arranged, conducted, and their representa-
tives participated in information seminars around the world,4 4
their representatives prepared and circulated information pa-
pers, and wrote articles in learned journals directed to de-mysti-
fying asset-based financing for high-value mobile equipment.
In fact, Unidroit, IATA and the AWG - supported by many
governments - were fully prepared, as was the host State of
South Africa, to hold the Diplomatic Conference in the year
2000 or early 2001 and the Unidroit Governing Council specifi-
cally approved this. However, ICAO administrative and bureau-
43 See, e.g., Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October
1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at the Hague on 28 September 1955,
opened for signature Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613, ICAO Doc. 8932; Additional Proto-
col No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as
Amended by the Protocol done at the Hague on 28 September 1955 and at
Guatamala City on 8 March 1971, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc.
9147.
44 The AWG and IATA organised or played major roles in seminars and meet-
ings in: Moscow, Brussels, London, Geneva, Beijing, New Delhi, Singapore, Jo-
hannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Miami, Tokyo, Bangkok and Dubai.
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cratic processes led to the delay until October or November
2001.
In 1998, the AWG and IATA, on behalf of those two private
sector bodies and ICAO, commissioned an independent Eco-
nomic Impact Assessment,45 prepared by two distinguished, applied
international economists from the Salomon Centre at New York
University and INSEAD in France. The study estimated that
given widespread acceptance and effective implementation, air-
lines could save billions of U.S. dollars annually in financing
costs. 46 Reviewing the modalities and implications of the law
and finance relationship and the benefits of asset-based financ-
ing, the Economic Assessment describes in detail and attempts to
quantify various categories of economic benefit in relation to
effective implementation of the Convention/Aircraft Protocol.
"Effective implementation" is defined as including all actions
necessary to ensure that the treaty provisions will be strictly and
reliably enforced by national courts and the establishment, effi-
cient operation and appropriate regulation of an international
registry system in which property instruments in aircraft and en-
gines will be recorded, thus determining their priority in a fully
transparent manner.47 The study provides a set of estimates of
aircraft equipment-financing cost savings based on ranges of
pricing differentials reflecting the greater security for lenders
and enhanced access to capital markets as a result of lower
risk.41 Significantly, in addition to the Convention/Protocol re-
ducing the need for sovereign debt to acquire aircraft and en-
gines, the authors of the Economic Assessment point out that, in
certain cases, credit will be extended where, absent the Cape
Town regime, it would simply be unavailable to the prospective
borrower or lessor at any price. 41 Commenting on the "op-
tional" provisions, the study states:
The adoption of these provisions would significantly enhance the
economic value of the law reform in a particular country. Coun-
tries that opt-in to these provisions can expect materially greater
financing-related benefits than those that do not. Moreover, the
45 Anthony Sanders & Ingo Walter, Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment as Applicable to Aircraft Equipment through the Air-
craft Equipment Protocol: Economic Impact Assessment, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 339 (1998)
[hereinafter Economic Assessment].
46 See id. at iii.
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optional provisions contain certain features that are necessary, if
not by themselves sufficient, conditions to accessing capital mar-
kets in transactions secured by aviation equipment.
50
It should be noted that the AWG and IATA were also mem-
bers of Unidroit's "Steering and Revisions Committee," directed
by the Unidroit Governing Council to complete the work on the
treaties, and thus, were in a position of special relationship with
Unidroit. For its part, the ICAO Secretariat had some difficulty
in accepting and accommodating input from the two non-gov-
ernmental entities as full partners in the negotiating process de-
spite the very significant contribution of both to the success of
the treaty-drafting process. Furthermore, it was only at the very
end of the negotiations that ICAO abandoned its earlier stance
strongly favoring a "single instrument," and reluctantly agreed
to accept the Convention plus Protocol approach, partly in an
effort to help ensure that ICAO be designated the Depositary
for the Aircraft Protocol. In the event the Diplomatic Confer-
ence unanimously decided otherwise, Article XXXVII of the
Protocol designates Unidroit as the Depositary in the same man-
ner as Article 62 of the Convention does for the umbrella
treaty.5' This clear recognition by the Diplomatic Conference
and the participating governments of Unidroit's long involve-
ment in, dedication to, and perseverance with the mobile equip-
ment treaties, especially for aircraft equipment, has without
doubt enhanced its international reputation, and has led to
Unidroit becoming better known and more widely respected.
Unidroit has continued its work on the Railway Rolling Stock
and Space Assets Protocols, largely building on the negotiating
process and final text of the Aircraft Equipment Protocol with
the active involvement of the Intergovernmental Organization
for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) and the UN Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). As a
result of a more focused and energized process and the success
achieved at a number of meetings, there are now preliminary
draft texts with respect to both these high value mobile assets.
Indeed, Unidroit anticipates that the Rail Protocol will possibly
be completed and a conference convened to adopt and open it
for signature and ratification within the next two years. This
will, eventually, be followed by the conclusion of a Space Proto-
col to the Cape Town Convention.
50 Id.
51 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 62; Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXXVII.
CAPE TOWN CONVENTION
The Cape Town Convention instruments represent a classic
win-win scenario. Airlines win in that, over time, the cost of air-
craft and engine acquisition will be reduced in relation to what
they would have been absent the new regime. The manufactur-
ers and leasing companies win in that lower costs for aircraft
and engines will enhance their sales and leases and increase
their markets. Financial institutions win because their risks are
reduced and their assets are better protected within a treaty
framework providing for predictability and transparency. Gov-
ernments win due to a reduced need for sovereign guarantees,
for involvement in financing equipment upgrade and replace-
ment, and to underwrite capital expenditures by their national
airlines. Passengers also win since it is anticipated that the effec-
tive and widespread implementation of the Convention/Proto-
col will eventually lead to lower fares. Above all, the availability
of more and less expensive financing for the international air
transport industry will help facilitate fleet modernization with
attendant significant benefits in terms of safety, fuel efficiency,
noise reduction, environmental protection, and consumer
comfort.
An important move was made by the Export-Import Bank of
the United States on January 31, 2003, when it decided to lower
the cost of acquisition of certain types of aircraft on the basis of
reduced risk in connection with the Cape Town instruments.
On that date, the Ex-Im Bank announced a "plan to reduce its
exposure fee by one-third on financing of large commercial air-
craft to buyers in foreign countries that sign, ratify and imple-
ment the Cape Town Convention. . .Ex-Im Bank's plan will
enable eligible foreign buyers to receive an Ex-Im Bank expo-
sure fee of as low as 2 percent, a one-third reduction of the cur-
rent minimum 3 percent exposure fee on financing of large
commercial aircraft. '5 2 The export credit agencies of other ma-
jor Western countries and Japan are still studying this decision
by the Ex-Im Bank and their eventual reactions will be of great
interest, especially to airlines around the world.
A number of governments have indicated that they are cur-
rently actively engaged in the internal processes required in or-
der to ratify the Cape Town instruments, and it is generally
52 Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Offers
One-Third Reduction of Its Exposure Fee on Export Financing for U.S. Large
Commercial Aircraft (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://www.exim.gov/pressre
lease.cfm/6F76B4BA-1032-5BOF-BDC2F28463DF4239/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2004).
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expected that the Convention and Aircraft Protocol will secure
the additional ratifications needed for entry into force in 2004.
As noted above, the United States did not sign the treaties at the
conclusion of the Cape Town Diplomatic Conference, but even-
tually did so after careful inter-agency review and consideration,
on May 9, 2003. The Bush Administration is now seeking the
advice and consent of the Senate to permit deposit of the U.S.
instrument of ratification. Indeed, the U.S. Government gave
additional concrete evidence of its commitment to the Cape
Town treaties by hosting a Special Seminar for significant stake-
holders on June 15, 2003, in Paris.5" That meeting was specifi-
cally directed to energizing the ratification process and ensuring
that all necessary information was made available to allow for
informed decision-making by governments to facilitate early en-
try into force of the Convention/Protocol.
Unidroit and ICAO, as well as the AWG and IATA, believe that
a "building block" approach is the key to fostering sufficiently
widespread acceptance of the Cape Town Convention and Air-
craft Protocol. When they come into force and the initial trans-
actions are conducted within the treaty framework, the real,
substantial benefits will quickly become evident, and this in
turn, will attract more adherents to the new regime, further pro-
moting its advantages and increasing the critical mass of Con-
tracting States.
As is stated so succinctly but eloquently on the back cover of
the Official Commentary:
The 2001 Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Equipment Proto-
col represent one of the most ambitious and imaginative private
commercial law projects ever to have been concluded. By provid-
ing an international legal regimen for security and related inter-
ests in aircraft objects, railway rolling stock and space assets, the
Convention and Protocol help to reduce legal uncertainty caused
by differences in national laws and thereby open up to develop-
ing countries access to finance at reasonable CoSt. 5 4
At this most difficult of times for the aviation industry and all
its component parts, with sluggish traffic, reduced passenger
revenues and massive retrenchment, there is a clear and present
53 The Seminar, at which the author was privileged to speak, was attended by
representatives of Albania, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, France, Ghana, Haiti, In-
donesia, Kenya, Korea, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Nepal, Romania, Rus-
sia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sweden, Viet Nam, the United Kingdom, the USA
and Uzbekistan as well as Taiwan, the EBRD and the AWG.
54 GOOBE, supra note 30, at back cover.
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need for airlines to lower costs while respecting environmental
concerns as they "meet the needs of the peoples of the world for
safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport."55 The
timely advent of the Cape Town regime, with its prospects for
aiding the airlines financially while letting governments further
disengage from subsidizing and providing fiscal safety nets for
carriers, and ensuring more "Practicality, Party autonomy, Pre-
dictability, Transparency and Sensitivity"56 is an idea whose time
has come - and none too soon!
55 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec. 7, 1944,
61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, art. 44(d).
56 GOODE, supra note 30, at 7-8.
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